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The modern battlefield is extremely lethal. Many weapons systems provide the
capability to engage a target far in excess of the range at which positive target
identification can be made. This capability increases the likelihood of inadvertent
engagement of friendly forces or, fratricide. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken
to provide solutions to reduce fratricide. These solutions generally focus in one of two
areas: target identification or situational awareness. Several situational awareness
systems are under development. The Marine Corps has explored the concept of
improving situational awareness through a mobile network application; however, the
requirements for this system are not well understood.
One method of identifying the situational awareness requirements, which was
used in this research, was through simulation. Three simulated combat environments
were modeled (urban, mixed, and mountainous desert terrain) and the interaction of
forces in the environments was observed. Based on the observations and the author's
experience, conclusions were drawn about the requirements for a network situational
awareness system. Principle findings of this research include system update rates, visual
display resolution, and when situational awareness or target identification systems are
preferred.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CID is the process of obtaining an accurate characterization of all potential targets
in a combatant's area of the battlefield so that high confidence, real-time application of
tactical options and weapons resources can occur [Ref. 1]. Numerous Combat
Identification (CID) initiatives have been undertaken to reduce fratricide on the
battlefield. One element of CED is situational awareness (SA). SA is the real-time,
accurate knowledge of one's own location, the location of other friendly forces, the
location of enemy forces, and the location of neutrals [Ref. 1]. To meet the SA portion of
the CID requirement, the Marine Corps has initiated a series of advanced concept
technology demonstrations (ACTDs) entitled, "Extending the Littoral Battle-space"
(ELB). The ELB or a similar system, would ultimately provide Marines with a mobile,
tactical network in which operational data, including SA information, could be
exchanged. To date, the development process of the ELB has emphasized construction of
the network over analysis of the data required to perform the SA function of CID.
Consequently, the data that is required to provide SA, at the lowest unit levels in a
network environment, is not well understood.
This thesis seeks to contribute to ongoing CID system research by determining
requirements for providing SA through a network application using position location
information (PLI).
A four-phase methodology was used in conducting this study of SA. In the first
phase, a review of on-going initiatives in CID, future Marine force structure and doctrine,
and the anticipated threat was conducted. The second phase entailed constructing a series
xvii
of detailed simulations modeling a range of environments and conditions in which
Marines are expected to operate in the future. Three scenarios where modeled using the
Janus simulation tool. The initial scenario modeled a Military Operation on Urban
Terrain (MOUT) in which a small Marine infantry battalion cleared a town defended by a
threat force. Next, a scenario was modeled in which a reinforced Marine infantry
battalion attacked to open a route defended by a mechanized enemy force in an area of
mixed open and close vegetation and terrain. The last scenario modeled a reinforced
Marine Expeditionary Brigade size operation against a reinforced, heavy mechanized
enemy force in a mountainous desert environment. Each model additionally contained a
coalition force operating adjacent to the Marine force.
The three scenario models where run in the third phase of this research.
Observations were made of the interaction among the forces in each scenario and results
of the interactions were collected. In phase four, observations of the interaction of virtual
forces were combined with Marine Corps doctrine; tactics techniques, and procedures;
and the author's experience (as an infantry commander in the Fleet Marine Force, as a
Weapons Tactics Instructor, and as a controller/instructor through 20 Combined Arms
Exercises) to produce SA data requirements.
Several important findings result from this study. In MOUT, SA becomes more
important than target identification. An update rate of one to two seconds is required to
accurately reflect PLI. SA devices should be capable of aggregating and de-aggregating
units and zooming to a level of resolution appropriate for the user's area of interest and
required view. Additionally, SA devices should be deployed at the lowest level possible;
equipping individuals with SA transmitters would provide the most accurate depiction of
xviii
the disposition of forces in an urban battle space. For mixed terrain, mountainous desert
terrain, or situations in which large scale operations are conducted, resolvable distances,
as stipulated by the Marine Corps CED operational requirements document (ORD),
appear satisfactory. However, during dismounted trench-clearing operations, a resolution
to 10m and an update rate of approximately three to five seconds is required.
To expand on the results of this study, additional simulations could be conducted
in which Marines control the virtual forces employed in the Janus scenarios. Using Janus
in this war-game like manner would allow a team of qualified Marines to evaluate the
effect of human intuition and indecision on SA requirements, CJD, and fratricide
conditions.
xix
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xx
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Without the help of the staff of TRADOC Analysis Center, Monterey it would not
have been possible to complete this paper; special thanks to Harold, Jeff, and Sandra for
their assistance. Thanks to Professor Osmundson, who supported all aspects of this
project and was instrumental in helping sort out the technological implications of the
interactions observed. Thanks to Mr. Brinkley, who provided insight into the
presentation of ideas. Most importantly, thanks to Roxanne and Eden for allowing me
time away from home to work on this project.
xxi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xxn
I. INTRODUCTION
Aleutian island of Kiska, 1942: The campaign on the island
generated a fratricide toll of 28 killed and 50 wounded. As there were no
enemy present, this was 100% of the casualties suffered by the well
trained but inexperienced forces [Ref. 1].
Persian Gulf, 1990: U. S. forces where involved as victims in 22
reported fratricide events. Seven of these events (32%) involved the U. S.
Marines and resulted in 21 casualties (14 killed and 7 wounded). The
number of incidents in which Marines were victims was disproportionate
to the size of the Marine force in theater. In almost half (43%) of the
Marine Victim incidents, Marines were also the shooters [Ref. 1].
A. BACKGROUND
The modern battlefield is dynamic and chaotic. Combat operations are
characterized by high tempo, fast closing speeds, long weapon ranges, first round kill
capability, and quick firing decisions. The lethality of the combat environment has
increased decision-makers demand for timely, accurate information to improve
situational awareness, limit uncertainty, and reduce fratricide. A fundamental element of
this information is Combat Identification.
Combat Identification (CED) is the process of obtaining an accurate
characterization of all potential targets in a combatant's area of the
battlefield so that high confidence, real-time application of tactical options
and weapons resources can occur [Ref. 4].
It is generally accepted that three elements comprise the CID process: target
identification (TI); situational awareness (SA); and tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) [Ref. 1]. Situational awareness is the real-time, accurate knowledge of one's own
location, the location of other friendly forces, the location of enemy forces, and the
location of neutrals. Target identification is the ability to interrogate or recognize—as
friend, enemy, or neutral
—
potential targets to aid weapons operators in shoot-no-shoot
1
decisions. TTPs are tools used by the war fighter to augment sensors and maximize the
use of available resources. These three elements, SA, TI, and TTPs, provide war fighters
with information and decision tools necessary to make engagement decisions during
combat [Ref. 1]. SA and TI are facilitated by TTPs and other factors. SA is further
amplified by accurate position location information (PLI). Position location information
is data, self-reported or derived by active participation in a positioning network, which
relates a friendly entity to a point on a map [Ref. 1]. Figure 1 depicts the relationship of
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Figure 1. The Combat Identification Process
The Marine corps has determined the mission need for improved CID capability
and has described the operational requirements for a CID system [Ref. 5]. The CID
system, or system of systems, will be required to provide SA for commanders in near real
time and TI for shooters in real time under the full spectrum of battlefield conditions.
Many existing devices are currently under evaluation to determine their suitability to
meet the TI and SA portion of the CED system. Additionally, initiatives by the other
military services are under consideration. To meet the SA portion of the CEO
requirement, the Marine Corps has initiated a series of experiments in new technology
which include the use of a tactical, wireless network developed through commercial, off-
the-shelf technology. The title of these wireless network experiments is Extending the
Littoral Battle-space (ELB). It is envisioned that the ELB or a similar system, would
ultimately provide Marines with a mobile, tactical network in which operational data
could be exchanged. This data could include SA and possibly TI information. To date,
the development process of the ELB has emphasized construction of the network over
analysis of the data required to perform the SA function.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis will examine the situational awareness component of CED, to
determine the data required to perform this fundamental battlefield function, when
conducted as a network application using position location information.
C. SCOPE
This thesis will examine the situational awareness data required to conduct a
network application of CID. The TI and TTP elements of CH) will not be analyzed.
D. METHODOLOGY
A systems engineering approach was used to accomplish this research. An
overview of the methodology follows. Modeling and simulation was used to observe the
interactions of friendly and enemy forces operating in a variety of virtual environments.
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Observations of the interaction of virtual forces was combined with Marine Corps
doctrine, TTPs, and the author's experience (in the Fleet Marine Force, as a Weapons
Tactics Instructor, and as a controller/instructor through 20 Combined Arms Exercises) to
produce SA data requirements. The details of the process used follow. Initially, a
literature search was conducted for background and amplifying information on the
subjects of CID and SA. A review of the Marine Corps concept of employment for CID
was conducted. A review of present and future threats, doctrine, force structures,
equipment, and operational concepts was also conducted. Information gathered from this
review was used to determine the possible Marine forces, threats, concept of operations,
fire support, and operating environments likely in the future (each of these factors would
then be modeled using a simulation tool). Upon completion of the review, simulation
tools were evaluated and a tool selected. The tool was then used to construct the models
and run the simulations. Finally, data generated by the simulations was compiled and
reviewed.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Questions
What situational awareness data is required to perform CID in a network
application?
How do scenario variations affect situational awareness data?
2. Secondary Research Questions
In what physical environments should the simulations take place?
What are the appropriate size and composition of the simulated forces?
Which simulation tool should be used?
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F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter II describes the rational for
selection of the simulation tool used and details important aspects of Janus—the
simulation tool selected. This chapter also discusses the selection of environments and
forces modeled. Chapters HI provides definitions of symbols and icons used throughout
the remainder of the thesis. Chapters IV, V, and VI discuss the military operations on
urban terrain (MOUT), mixed terrain, and mountainous desert simulation scenarios
respectively. Chapter VII provides overall conclusions gathered from the simulations as
well as recommended areas for further study.
G. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY
Conclusions and recommendations of this study are expected provide initial
requirements on which CID network architecture, design, and implementation decisions
may be based.
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II. SELECTION OF SIMULATION, ENVIRONMENTS, AND
FORCES
A. INTRODUCTION
The simulated scenarios used in this thesis needed to be reasonably accurate
representations of future situations Marines might face. To ensure scenario accuracy, the
appropriate physical operating environments, threat force composition, friendly force
composition, and doctrine needed to be modeled. Additionally, a powerful, flexible
simulation tool that could process this information was required. This chapter will
discuss the selection of the simulation used to model force interactions, present an
overview of important aspects of the selected simulation, and describe the selection of
forces and environments implemented in the simulated scenarios.
B. SELECTION OF SIMULATION TOOL
1. Available Tools
Simulation tools reasonably available for use included Janus version 7.06dc, The
Joint conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS), the High Level Architecture Warrior
simulation (HLA Warrior), and the MAGTF Tactical Warfare System (MTWS).
The Janus simulation tool was locally available, UNIX based, and has been in use
successfully for many years. Janus provides a high level of detail and functionality in its
latest version, v7.06dc and is regarded as an accurate model. Contractor support for
Janus was locally available.
The JCATS was not locally available but was accessible at other locations within
one days travel to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). JCATS, a UNIX based tool, has
been in use successfully for many years and is regarded as relatively accurate simulation.
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JCATS provides greater detail than the other tools examined in its visual display of
MOUT.
The UNIX based MTWS has been in use for many years throughout the Marine
Corps, is well known, and viewed as reliable. The MTWS GUI is less user-friendly than
the other tools examined. Although MTWS was installed and functional aboard NPS, no
documentation or support was available.
PC based HLA Warrior was a new simulation tool developed by the TRADOC
Analysis Center, Monterey, California. HLA Warrior was locally available and, although
new, was regarded as reliable. Warrior is based upon the logic and algorithms of the
Janus tool but improves on its performance by providing spreadsheet output. This output
is then easily imported into common word processing and spreadsheet software for
further analysis. However, because scenarios must created in Janus, then executed in
Warrior, operators must learn to use both systems. As a result, the length of the
simulation learning curve is essentially doubled.
2. Simulation Selection
The Janus Simulation tool was selected for use in this thesis because of its history
of reliability, local availability, and contractor support. Additionally, numerous terrain
databases were available to support construction of varied scenarios.
C. THE JANUS SIMULATION TOOL
1. Overview
Janus is a high-resolution combat simulation tool, which allows users much
flexibility in creating and executing scenarios. A wide variety of terrain databases and
equipment templates are available to support scenario development from small unit
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tactics through corps level operations. Weapons, personnel, vehicles, and aircraft are
modeled in detail to appropriately represent combat system characteristics. These
characteristics include primary and alternate weapon systems capability, sensor
capability, mobility, survivability, and vulnerability. The tool also allows construction of
new weapons systems and force templates. The interactions of the combat systems with
each other, as well as the impact of the battlefield environment (i.e., weather, time of day,
obscuration, and terrain features) on acquisition and engagement of targets, are
represented at a high level of fidelity in Janus [Ref. 3].
2. Search-Detect-Engage (SDE) Algorithm
When a Janus scenario was run, all entities processed the search-detect-engage
algorithm continuously. The algorithm is long, complex, and iterative. An overview of
the algorithm:
During search, detection, and engagement the following are considered:
Sensor Capability of the Observer
Range From Observer to Target





Observer Field of View
Observer Search Area Size
Rules of Engagement
During engagement, the following are additionally considered:
• Weapon Range
• Ordnance Type and Characteristics
• Ammunition Load
• Probability of Hit (PH)
• Probability of Kill (PK)
Although this algorithm is thorough, it fails to consider the following important
points that affect simulation performance:




By omitting the capability for entities to maintain situational awareness of
adjacent units and the scheme of maneuver, Janus increased the likelihood of fratricide
among same-side forces. This occurred because Janus allowed entities to immediately
engage targets recognized, where friendly forces were likely to be located, before fully
resolving the target's identification as friend or foe. The value by which this process
increased fratricide was unclear. An example of this situation follows. Two rifle squads
occupy two adjacent building on the same side of a street. Both squad leaders know the
others initial location and the concept of operations, which directs them both to
simultaneously attack North across the street at 0800. At 0800 both squads leave their
respective building and begin the attack North. As they cross the street the Marines know
they can expect enemy in the buildings ahead and will immediately engage targets that
become visible. The Marines also expect to see the adjacent squad on their flank and
therefore, must identify targets on the flank as friend or foe before making an
engagement decision. The same situation in Janus plays-out differently. The Marines
leave the buildings at 0800. If they recognize a target ahead or to the flank, they
immediately engage, unless the target is first identified as a friend. The shooter will
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continue to engage until the target is resolved to the identification level and determined to
be a friend.
3. Janus Entity Situational Awareness (SA)
In a Janus scenario, sides are the fundamental division of forces. Example sides
are Marines, Army, coalition, or enemy. When constructing forces during the
development of a Janus scenario, same-side forces must be placed into groups. For
example, all the platoons, squads, teams, and individuals within a Marine rifle company
could be grouped together. Any combination of same-side forces may be grouped. The
implication of grouping during a simulation is that information Janus provides to entities
within the same group allows them to seemingly possess perfect situational awareness.
The high level of SA within a group results in group members never engaging each other.
Within a group, no matter how chaotic and convoluted the situation may be, fratricide
will never occur. To work around this situation, same-side entities must be divided into
as many groups as possible. The ideal situation would be to assign an individual entity
(individual rifleman, single crew served weapon, individual tank) to a group essentially
creating one group per entity. Unfortunately, the number of groups is restricted to the
number of workstations available to process simulation data. As workstations were a
limited resource during this thesis work, grouping was restricted to the platoon level. The
result of platoon simulation grouping was to artificially enhance platoon internal SA,
eliminate platoon internal fratricide, and reduce the overall number of fratricide incidents.
The value, by which grouping decreased fratricide, was unclear.
While fratricide internal to platoons was eliminated, near miss situations, many of
which would in reality produce fratricide, did still occur in the simulations. An example
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of a situation in which near miss might result in fratricide occurs when a squad fires
through an adjacent squad at an approaching enemy. While these near miss situations
were noted in the observations of each environmental scenario, near miss fratricidal kills
where not inflicted by Janus.
4. Effect of SDE and SA on Simulation Results
The Janus search-detect-engage algorithm artificially increased fratricide by an
unknown value while situational awareness among same-group forces in Janus artificially
decreased fratricide by an unknown value. Careful observation of the Janus simulation
runs conducted for this thesis suggests that the cumulative affect of the search-detect-
engage algorithm and group SA is only a slight overall increase in fratricide.
Accordingly, it is believed that the fratricidal interactions observed in the simulation may
be used reasonably conclusively.
D. SELECTION OF SIMULATED ENVIRONMENTS
The Marine Corps is projected to operate in a broad spectrum of environments in
the future [Ref. 6]; consequently, the diversity of these environments needed to be
captured in the simulated scenarios modeled. Open desert, jungle, mountainous, arctic,
wooded, urban, and ocean are some examples of possible operating environments. Janus
provided a library of numerous virtual environments that were available off-the-shelf.
This eliminated the time and difficulty of constructing new terrain databases, which was
outside the scope of this thesis. In selecting the environments used in the scenarios, the
following concepts were considered:
• Increasing Urbanization of the Global Population
• Location of Areas of Interest to the United States
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• Likely Future Conflict Areas
• Balance in the Range of Scenario Environments
• Focus on Periods of Peak Interaction of Forces Over Lengthy Maneuver
• Availability of Terrain Databases
The rational for the environments used in the simulated scenarios follows:
As the worlds population shifts towards urban centers, they will become likely
locations for operations [Ref. 6]; therefore, a military operations on urban terrain
(MOUT) scenario was selected for evaluation in this thesis. The McKenna MOUT site at
Fort Benning, Georgia provides the setting for the MOUT scenario.
A significant portion of the world's population and resources are located in desert
regions. The United States maintains interests in many desert locations as well.
Consequently, a desert scenario was selected for evaluation. Open desert tends to
provide long line of sight between entities which, affords forces operating in open desert
conditions with individual and unit SA higher than many other settings. To provide a
more dynamic situation with shorter lines of site, the mountainous desert environment of
Fort Irwin, California was used as the setting for the desert scenario.
A scenario that contained varied terrain and vegetation was also desired to
balance between the urban and desert environments. South central France was selected
for this scenario environment because it provided a mix of open and close terrain and
vegetation types with numerous small towns located along the mobility corridors.
The scenarios focus on high tempo, high intensity combat operations in which the
enemy is directly engaged. Scenarios depicting humanitarian assistance operations,
lengthy maneuver without contact, and bypass of enemy positions were omitted. A
humanitarian assistance operation was omitted because no simulation tool available
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provides adequate capability to model this scenario. The other types of operations were
omitted because they were expected to put less stress on SA than situations in which
friendly, enemy, and coalition forces engage in close proximity.
E. SELECTION OF FORCES TO MODEL
Marine forces, coalition forces, and threat forces where included in each
simulated scenario.
1. Marine Forces
Marine forces operate as task organized units known as Marine Air Ground Task
Forces (MAGTFs). These organizations range from Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),
through Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), to Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in
size. MAGTFs are task organized for the specific mission and, in the future, are likely to
be employed primarily as operational maneuver elements from a sea-base. When using
the sea-basing concept, as much infrastructure as possible will remain at sea while only
necessary combat forces are sent ashore [Refs. 6, 7, and 8]. The concepts of MAGTF
task organization and sea basing were represented in the scenarios molded. The scenarios
cover a range of unit sizes through MEB level. Little information on the future force
structure of the Marine Corps was available other than the introduction of new systems
such as the Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV), lightweight 155m howitzer,
120mm mortar, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Javelin, AH-1Z, UH-
1Y, V-22, and joint strike fighter (JSF). These systems or their capability were
represented in the scenarios modeled. Other aspects of the Marine force structure were
based upon existing tables of organization and equipment.




Mounted and Dismounted Movement
Light Armored Vehicle Operations
Helicopter-borne Operations
Military Operations on Urban Terrain
Close Air Support, to Include Both Fixed and Rotary Wing Missions
Unmanned Air Vehicle Reconnaissance
Indirect Fire Support
2. Coalition Forces
In the future it is expected that U. S. forces will operate along-side forces from
other nations [Ref. 6]; accordingly, a coalition force was included in each scenario to
represent this condition. The coalition force for each scenario follows a model based
upon a lightly mechanized, United Kingdom, Royal Army battalion equipped with Fox
light armored reconnaissance vehicles.
3. Enemy Forces
The threat of the future may take many forms ranging from disorganized, lightly
armed irregulars to organized, disciplined, armored and mechanized forces. For the
purposes of the scenarios modeled for use in this thesis, the threat was structured as a
well organized, armored, mechanized, and infantry force equipped with the latest
generation of former Soviet Union (FSU) weapons systems and tactics. This type threat
force was selected for use in the modeled scenarios because of its capabilities in the areas
of survivability, mobility, firepower, sensors, and long weapon ranges. It was assumed
that these factors would contribute to creating the most challenging CED environment for
Marines. Additionally, FSU weapons and tactics are expected to remain in prevalent use
throughout many nation states for the foreseeable future.
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Using the Janus simulation tool, scenarios were constructed in three terrain
environments: urban, mixed, and mountainous desert. Various forms and elements of
the MAGTF, U.K. Royal Army, and armored-mechanized-infantry threat comprise the
forces interacting in the scenarios. The details of these scenarios are presented in later
chapters.
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III. GENERAL SCENARIO NOTES
A. INTRODUCTION
Several issues are common to all the simulations conducted for this thesis.
General military and Janus symbols, observed interaction types, and firing criteria are
used throughout the discussion of the simulated scenarios. These common issues are
described here, in detail, before presenting specific simulation results.
B. DEFINITION OF SCENARIO SYMBOLS
Before discussing and displaying important aspects of the simulated scenarios,
common symbols used throughout Janus and this thesis must be defined. Common
military and Janus specific symbols are provided. Figure 2 depicts common military
symbols. Unit type symbols, unit size symbols, and example combinations of the two
types is provided. Infantry fire-team and crew served weapons examples are also
provided. Figures 3 through 5 depict entity symbols commonly observed in Janus.
During a simulation run, Marine entities appear in blue, U.K. entities appear in purple,
and enemy entities appear in red. Symbols used in Janus to represent most Marine
equipment resemble the actual equipment. Notable exceptions are aircraft. In order to
avoid creating drawings of Marine aircraft, existing drawings of Army and airforce
aircraft were used in the simulations. The aircraft entities themselves were assigned the
capabilities and weapons systems of the represented Marine aircraft.
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Common Symbols for Entity and Unit Types
i t f z^ ® isiisi i§us
Infantry Tank Assault Medium Recon/ Infantry Infantry Mechanized Light Armor Artillery
Fighting (M1A1) Team Machine Gun Scout FireTeam Infantry Armored
Vehicle (Rocket) Team Position Recon
(AAAV) (LAR)
7TD Q S «$• f T
Obstacle Air Defense 81mm 60mm HMLA VMFA/VMA HMM/HMH/
Clearing Det Mortars Mortars Attack (FW CAS) VMM




Symbols for Unit Size
•• •••
I II
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AAAV, 3dMlAl, 1st Infantry Squad, 1st Armor Platoon, Mechanized
1st Squad, Attached to 2d Platoon, Company A Infantry
2d Platoon, Company B Company B Company HQ
Company B Company C
Figure 2. Common Military Unit Symbols
Example Janus Threat System Icons
•a P.
~
BRDM-2 T-80 BMP-2 BTR-70
Figure 3. Example Janus Threat Entity Symbols
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Helicopter, Marine, Light Helicopter, Marine, Light






* Army and Airforce system icons assigned Marine aircraft capabilities in Janus simulations.
Figure 4. Example Janus Marine Aircraft Entity Symbols





LAV 25 AAAV Tow
Vehicle
M1A1 LAV-AT LAV-M
Figure 5. Example Janus Marine and UK Ground Entity Symbols
C. DESCRIPTION OF ENTITY INTERACTION
While the simulated scenarios ran, four types of interactions were observed
among the entities. These interactions where classified as In Range, In Line of Sight,
Near Miss, and Fratricide.
• In Range: Entities moved within range of each other's weapons systems.
• In Line of Sight: Entities move within visual range of each other and direct
line of sight (LOS) exists between the entities.
• Near Miss: Entities are within range and LOS of each other and one of the
following possibilities occurs. In the first possibility, a friendly shooter
engages an enemy target while a friendly entity is present on the shooters
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weapon-target line and within the shooter's weapon danger area. The friendly
entity on the shooter's weapon-target line is unaffected by this engagement.
In the second possibility, a friendly shooter intentionally engages another
friendly entity mistaking it as an enemy. The shooter misses and the friendly
target entity is unaffected.
• Fratricide: Entities are within range and LOS of each other and one of the
following possibilities occurs. In the first possibility, a friendly shooter
engages an enemy target while a friendly entity is present on the shooters
weapon-target line and within the shooter's weapon danger area. The friendly
entity on the shooter's weapon-target line is affected or killed by this
engagement. In the second possibility, a friendly shooter intentionally engages
another friendly entity mistaking it as an enemy. The friendly target entity is
affected or killed by the shooter.
The interaction type, entities involved, and interaction time were recorded and
presented in the results section for each scenario.
D. FIRING CRITERIA
Firing criteria must be established for forces in each Janus scenario. Janus firing
criteria are roughly equivalent to rules of engagement (ROE) in that they prescribe the
conditions under which an entity may engage a target. Three firing criteria selections are
possible in Janus: aim-point, recognition, and identification. Using aim-point firing
criterion, an entity detects a target and may engage it without resolving any detail about
the target. An example of this firing criterion is a situation in which a shooter sees some
movement ahead and engages the location of the movement without determining the type
or identity of the target. This firing criterion would be used in situations where only
enemy are likely to be encountered and the possibility of same-side forces interacting
with each other is extremely low. Using recognition firing criteria, an entity observes a
possible target and resolves the target to determine if it is a human, motor vehicle,
armored vehicle, or, aircraft. The possible target may be engaged at this level of
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resolution. An example of this firing criterion is a situation in which a shooter sees some
movement ahead. The shooter observes the location of the movement and determines a
human is the source of the movement. The shooter then engages the human without
determining friend or foe. This firing criterion would be used in situations where hasty
firing decisions are required. Using identification firing criteria, an entity observes a
possible target and resolves the target to determine if it is a human, motor vehicle,
armored vehicle, or, aircraft. The entity then further resolves the possible target to
determine the specific type of entity observed, for example, human—Marine, tank—
M1A1, armored vehicle—BMP. The possible target may be engaged at this level of
resolution. An example of this firing criteria is a situation in which a shooter sees some
movement ahead; the shooter observes the location of the movement and determines a
human is the source of the movement; the human is determined to be an enemy; the
shooter then engages the enemy. This firing criterion would be used in situations where
time is available to make detailed firing decisions and absolute, positive target
identification is required before engagement is authorized. In Janus, selection of
identification firing criteria eliminates the possibility of fratricide among same-side
forces.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The symbols, entity interactions, and firing criterion described in this chapter are
used throughout the following chapters. The chapters that follow discuss the MOUT,
mixed terrain, and mountainous desert scenarios.
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IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)
SCENARIO
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents information about the MOUT scenario. Notes on the
scenario terrain, forces, and concept of operation are outlined along with simulation
parameters, and information describing the visual display of the scenario. Observations
of the simulation are presented and conclusions are drawn from the observations.
B. SCENARIO NOTES
1. Terrain
The urban terrain constructed for this scenario consists of a small European style


























Buildings in MOUT Scenario
The small town is located on a short, North-South oriented, ridge between two North-
South running streams. To the Northwest and Southeast of the town are 500m x 250m
swamps. High ground is located 500m West and 750m East. At its widest point, the
town is 750m x 750m and covers an area of approximately 526,500m 2 . The town is the
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site of a junction between two primary roads and contains a rail line and siding. Figures
6 and 7 provide an overview and detail view of the layout of the town.
Figure 6. MOUT Scenario Terrain Map-Overview
Figure 7. MOUT Scenario Terrain Map-Detail
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2. Forces
a. Friendly Force Composition
The Marine force in the MOUT scenario is made up of a reinforced
mechanized company team, identified as Company B, and an adjacent reinforced
mechanized infantry platoon, identified as 1 st Platoon, Company A. Both units are
reinforced by attached tank platoons and are supported by a single 81mm mortar platoon,
engineers, one section of rotary wing CAS aircraft (HMLA-Attack), one section of
assault support (HMLA-Utility) for casualty evacuation, an unmanned air vehicle for
reconnaissance, and a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company. Marine forces
are organized and equipped according to Marine Corps doctrine.
b. Coalition Force Composition
An infantry company supported by Fox vehicles represents the coalition
force. Platoons assigned to the company were organized smaller than their Marine
counterparts and consist of 23 soldiers each.
c. Enemy Force Composition
The enemy force is organized as a mechanized company outfitted with
standard FSU small arms and supported by BTR-70 vehicles. Enemy soldiers are
deployed throughout. Specific positions were selected to establish fields of fire along
streets, across open areas, and inside buildings.
3. Concept of Operations
The enemy force is deployed throughout the town to deny use of the railway and
road junction. The general concept for employment of Marine and coalition forces:




Platoon, Company A: Clear enemy from the East 25% of the town.
• UK Company: Clear enemy from the West 25% of the town.
• LAR Company: Screen to the East of the town.
Figures 8 through 1 1 depict an overview and details of the concept of operations
for the MOUT scenario.
Figure 8. MOUT Concept of Operations Overview
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Figure 9. MOUT Concept of Operations Detail - 1 st Platoon, Company A
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Figure 10. MOUT Concept of Operations Detail - Company B
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Figure 1 1 . MOUT Concept of Operations Detail - UK
4. Simulation Parameters
Several parameters were set to establish baseline conditions for the MOUT
scenario. The simulation was constructed to represent an attack commencing at 0800, on
a clear, sunny day. Enemy, coalition, and Marine forces employed no battlefield
obscuration. Obscuration was not employed in order to provide Marine forces with the
highest opportunity to maintain SA, make positive target identification, and reduce
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potential fratricide. The Janus fratricide capability was enabled for the scenario to allow
misidentification and possible engagement of same-side forces. The firing criterion for
all Marine and coalition forces was set to recognition. This setting was selected to
represent the rapid shoot-no-shoot decisions required by the close range, short line of
sight, of urban terrain and high intensity fight resulting from closing with a resolved
enemy. Groups, which establish the extent of perfect situational awareness among
entities, were set at the platoon level. Crew served weapons attached to and moving with
platoons were not grouped with their respective platoon. Platoon size groups were
established because the number of Janus workstations available was limited. As a result
of this setting, no fratricide occurs between same-group entities. Again, it was assumed
that the net effect of recognition firing criteria and platoon grouping, on total fratricidal
interactions, was negligible.
5. Visual Display of Scenario
During the execution of a scenario run, entities are displayed in Janus as they
move along their assigned routes into, out of, and between buildings. Janus does not
present a visual representation of the interior floor plan of buildings. Consequently, room
to room clearing and the inherent line of sight obstruction is not visually displayed.
However, room to room line of sight obstruction is factored into the Janus search-detect-
engage algorithm.
C. SCENARIO RESULTS
1. Fratricide Enabled vs. Disabled
For comparison, two runs of the scenario where conducted. In both runs, all
parameters were set identically except the fratricide capability. A general comparison of
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the interactions that occurred in the two runs is presented in Table 2. Comparison of the
interactions within units and between adjacent units is presented. The number of
occurrences and type of interaction is presented for each situation as well.
Comparison Between MOUT Fratricide Enabled and Disabled Simulation Runs




Pltn, Co., A (1/A) Nx4 Nx2
3
rd
Pltn, Co., B (3/B) Nx2,Fx4
2
nd
Pltn, Co., B (2/B) Nx2 Nx 1
1
st
Pltn, Co., B (1/B) Nx3 Nx5






1/A - 3/B Nx7,Fx 13
3/B -2/B Fx9
2/B -1/B Nx7 Nx5,Fxl4
B-UK Nx7,Fx7 Nx l,Fx8
B-LAR Fx2
Air - Ground Note Note
Total Interaction
Incidents
USMC only: N x 28
USMC+UK: N x 35, F x 7
USMC only: N x 33, F x 60
USMC+UK: N x 34, F x 68
Note: Although no fratricide or near miss interactions occurred, CAS aircraft over-fired USMC and UK
units on four occasions in both scenarios.
F = Fratricide Interaction N = Near Miss Interaction
Table 2. Comparison of MOUT Fratricide Enabled and Disabled Simulations
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Near miss incidents in the simulation do not produce the same effects on entities along
the weapon-target line as would occur in reality. In Janus, no affect is produced. In real
engagements, effects on entities on the weapon-target line range from no effect, through
suppression, to catastrophic kill. Accordingly, it is assumed that in ether simulated
scenario run, significant possibility of fratricide exists. The remainder of results presented
in this chapter will cover the fratricide enabled scenario run.
2. General MOUT Observations
For the entire scenario, all entities remained within range of each other. As the
Marine force advanced through the town, squads continually entered and exited line of
sight windows to other squads. These periods of line of sight occurred between squads of
the same platoon as well as across platoon boundaries. Line of sight windows that
occurred within Marine platoons frequently resulted in near miss interactions. Line of
sight windows that occurred between Marine platoons frequently resulted in both near
miss and fratricide. This situation also occurred between the Marines and UK force.
State changes in MOUT occur when individual entities leave a room or building
to enter an adjacent room, building, or open area between buildings. Marine and UK
entity State changes occurred nearly instantaneously in the MOUT scenario as personnel
moved through windows, doors, or other openings. While the condition of the currently
occupied room or building was friendly when friendly forces were present and in control
of the location, the adjacent room, building, or open area may be in a hostile (controlled
by enemy) or an unknown condition. Marine and UK forces making a state transition
into a hostile or unknown area were especially vulnerable to near miss and fratricide from
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adjacent friendly entities that had line of sight and expected to see enemy forces in the
area.
3. Entity Interaction Overview
Figures 12 through 20 chart the type of interaction (N = near miss, F = fratricide)
and simulation time of each interaction within and between units. On all charts, shooters
are plotted on the Y-axis, while targets are plotted on the X-axis. Where no interactions
took place between units, no chart is provided.























N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 12. MOUT—Interactions within l st Pltn., Co. A
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 13. MOUT—Interactions within 3d Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 14. MOUT—Interactions within 2d Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 15. MOUT—Interactions within 1st Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 16. MOUT—Interactions between 1st Pltn., Co. A and 3d Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 17. MOUT—Interactions between 3d Pltn., Co. B and 2d Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 18. MOUT—Interactions between 2d Pltn., Co. B and 1st Pltn., Co. B
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 19. MOUT—Interactions between Co. B, UK Co., LAR Co., and Snipers
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Time of Air Ground Entities in Open Effect on Ground
Egagement on Weapon-Target Line Entity
0:05:28 1^/B 2^/B None
0:05:55 |7Jf| ^ U1/B 2|1/B 3V1/B 1^/B 2^/B 3|2/B None
0:07:25 1^/B 2^/B 3^/B None
0:20:29 1|^2/B f 1f/B 2|/B 3^/B None
Figure 20. MOUT—Interactions between Aviation and Ground Entities
Figures 12 through 20 show a significant number of near miss and fratricide
interactions between entities (34 near miss, 68 fratricide). Although no actual air to
ground interactions occurred in the simulation, the possibility of near miss and fratricide
exists as a result of the 18 units over-fired by aviation ordnance.
Table 3 traces individual squad's movement through the town. The exposure time
of each squad during movement in the line of sight windows between buildings is
highlighted in this table. Table 4 summarizes the average exposure time for each squad.
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USMC Squad Exposure Time When Moving Between Buildings
Time Time Time Bldg Bldg Distance
Unit From To Interval From To (m) Rmks
3/1 /A 0:05:00 0:07:51 0:02:51 1 31 Begin Movement
3/1 /A 0:19:36 0:21.57 0:02:21 1 2 8
3/1 /A 0:21:57 0:24:20 0:02:23 2 3 10
3/1 /A 0:38:00 0:40:00 0:02:00 3 4 9 End Movement
1/1 /A 0:08:00 0:11:00 0:03:00 1 16 Begin Movement
1/1 /A 0:11:15 0:14:15 0:03:00 1 2 31
1/1 /A 0:14:30 0:16:39 0:02:09 2 3 8
1/1 /A 0:24:55 0:26:33 0:01:38 3 4 10
1/1 /A 0:26:55 0:30:14 0:03:19 4 5 17
1/1 /A 0:38:00 0:40:07 0:02:07 5 6 17 End Movement
2/1/A 0:05:00 0:09:55 0:04:55 1 34 Begin Movement
2/1 /A 0:32:00 0:38:27 0:06:27 1 2 63
2/1/A 0:38:32 0:41:18 0:02:46 2 3 17
2/1/A 0:40:51 0:45:01 0:04:10 3 4 21 End Movement
1/A Averaqe 0:03:05 21
3/3/B 0:01:55 0:04:23 0:02:28 1 11 Begin Movement
3/3/B 0:20:02 0:22:38 0:02:36 1 2 22
3/3/B 0:22:58 0:27:10 0:04:12 2 3 24
3/3/B 0:40:05 0:44:30 0:04:25 3 4 28
3/3/B 0:46:08 0:48:46 0:02:38 4 5 13 End Movement
2/3/B 0:10:50 0:13:15 0:02:25 1 11 Begin Movement
2/3/B 0:13:50 0:16:36 0:02:46 1 2 22
2/3/B 0:36:00 0:39:47 0:03:47 2 3 24
2/3/B 0:41:27 0:44:30 0:03:03 3 4 30 End Movement
1/3/B 0:08:00 0:10:28 0:02:28 1 17 Begin Movement
1/3/B 0:22:00 0:24:54 0:02:54 1 2 24
1/3/B 0:36:02 0:39:55 0:03:53 2 3 35 End Movement
3/B Averaqe 0:03:08 22
2/3/B 0:11:00 0:13:29 0:02:29 1 23 Begin Movement
2/3/B 0:25:02 0:27:10 0:02:08 1 2 8
2/3/B 0:27:30 0:30:07 0:02:37 2 3 20 Squad Destroyed
3/2/B 0:11:00 0:12:57 0:01:57 1 7 Begin Movement
3/2/B 0:15:02 0:16:46 0:01:44 1 2 23 Squad Destroyed
3/2/B NA NA NA 2 3 NA Incomplete Route
3/2/B NA NA NA 3 4 NA Incomplete Route
1/2/B 0:12:00 0:14:57 0:02:57 1 29 Begin Movement
1/2/B 0:19:00 0:21:59 0:02:59 1 2 23
1/2/B 0:27:02 0:30:25 0:03:23 2 3 14 Squad Destroyed
1/2/B NA NA NA 3 4 NA IncomDlete Route
2/B Averaqe 0:02:32 18
3/1 /B 0:15:01 0:17:54 0:02:53 1 26 Begin Movement
3/1 /B 0:20:02 0:20:25 0:02:23 1 2 20
3/1 /B 0:28:00 0:31 :00 0:03:00 2 3 24
3/1 /B 0:45:00 0:47:22 0:02:55 3 4 22 End Movement
2/1 /B 0:15:01 0:17:59 0:02:58 1 26 Begin Movement
2/1/B 0:34:02 0:36:55 0:02:53 1 2 23
2/1 /B 0:38:30 0:40:38 0:02:08 2 3 12 End Movement
1/1 /B 0:23:04 0:25:53 0:02:44 1 26 Begin Movement
1/1 /B 0:29:01 0:32:14 0:03:13 1 2 23
1/1/B 0:39:00 0:42:00 0:03:00 2 3 12
1/1/B 0:44:10 0:47:24 0:03:14 3 4 13 End Movement
1/B Averaqe 0:02:51 21
Overall 0:02:56 I
Table 3. MOUT Squad Exposure Time Between Buildings
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Table 4. MOUT Average Marine Squad Exposure
At first glance, the overall average of 21m covered in 0:02:56 seems to be an
excessive value considering the time it takes one Marine to run across a street may only
be a few seconds, depending upon the width of the street. However, the overall average
may be a relatively accurate representation of reality in measuring the total unit time to
cross even a narrow street. This is because of the many factors that affect squads as they
conduct exposed movement through open areas in the scenario. The squads may rush as
a group across an open area, cross as teams, as pairs, or individuals. The smaller the
aggregate that crosses, the longer the total time it takes the unit to cross the street.
Additionally, many squads took fire while crossing open areas, pinning Marines down,
sending them back into the starting building, and in general, lengthening the total time the
unit spent in an exposed posture.
4. Example Interactions
Five typical interactions are presented as examples to provide a feel for how
interactions between units operating in an urban environment might unfold over time.
42
a. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.
While tank 3 supports 2d Platoon's attack it observes and mistakenly
engages 3d Platoon. Events unfold as follows. At 0817 3d Squad, 3d Platoon departs a
building and moves toward the next building (Fig. 21).
Figure 21. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0817
Tank 3 has no line of sight to the squad. A line of sight fan is depicted in Figure 22.
Figure 22. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0817
At 0827, the squad enters the tank's line of sight (Figs. 23 and 24).
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Figure 23. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0827
Figure 24. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0827
Eight seconds elapse and at 0855 the tank engages the squad (Figs. 25 and 26).
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Figure 25. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0855
Figure 26. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0855
The tank engages the squad for 7 seconds until it determines the squad is friendly at 0902
and ceases fire (Figs. 27 and 28).
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Figure 27. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0902
Figure 28. Co. B: Tank, 2d Pltn. vs. 1 st Sqd., 3d Pltn.: 0902
The result of this interaction is one killed in 3d Squad, 3d Platoon.
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b. Co. B: 1
st
Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.
At 1457, 2d and 3d Squads of 1 st Platoon and 3d Squad, 2d Platoon
prepare to attack across the street (Fig. 29). There is no line of sight between the three
units.
Figure 29. Co. B: 1 st Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1457
At 1502, 1
st
Platoon exits its building and is observed by the platoon headquarters of 2d
Platoon (Fig. 30).
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Figure 30. Co. B: 1 st Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1502




Figure 31. Co. B: 1
st
Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1506
Two seconds later, at 1508, fire is exchanged between the 2d Squad and platoon
headquarters of 2d Platoon and 1 st Platoon (Fig. 32).
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Figure 32. Co. B: 1 st Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1508
By 1515, a full-scale, inter-unit engagement is underway (Fig. 33).
Figure 33. Co. B: 1 st Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1515
At 1601, the firefight continues with numerous casualties inflicted on 2d Platoon (Fig.
34).
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Figure 34. Co. B: 1
st
Pltn. vs. 2d Pita.: 1601
By 1609, 1:06 later, the engagement ends with 1 st Platoon destroying 2d Squad, 2d
Platoon (Fig. 35).
Figure 35. Co. B: 1 st Pltn. vs. 2d Pltn.: 1609
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c. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.
At 1624, 1
st
Platoon, UK Company prepares to attack across the street
while 1 st Platoon, Company B begins to enter a building (Fig. 36).
Figure 36. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1624
Elements of Company B do not have line of sight to the UK force (Fig. 37).
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Figure 37. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1624
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At 1628, the UK platoon moves into the street and is exposed to Company B (Fig. 38).
Figure 38. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1628
Seven seconds later, at 1635, Company B acquires the UK force and engages (Fig. 39).
Figure 39. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1635
By 1709, the B Company headquarters joins the engagement, creating a near miss
situation as it fires through 1
st
Platoon, Company B at the UK force (Fig. 40).
Figure 40. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1709
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By 1757, 1 st Platoon, Company B has ceased fire and entered a building. The B
Company headquarters continues to engage as the 1 st Platoon headquarters enters the
street and line of fire of the company headquarters creating another near miss condition
(Fig. 41).
Figure 41. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1757
By 1908 Company B has exited the street and most B Company entities have ceased fire
on 1
st
Platoon, UK Company, which has been destroyed as a result of the 2:16
engagement. The B Company machine gun required 1:46 seconds to determine that the
force it had engaged was friendly (Fig. 42).
Figure 42. Co. B vs. 1 st Pltn., UK Co.: 1908
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d. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.
At 1951, a machinegun attached to 1 st Platoon, Company B engages
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Figure 43. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 1951
The machinegun continues to engage as the UK Platoon advances into the open; the UK
platoon is out of the machine gunner's line of sight (Fig. 44 and 45).
Figure 44. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2019
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Figure 45. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2024
At 2029 the UK platoon enters the line of sight of the machine gunner (Fig. 46).
Figure 46. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2029
At 2056 the machinegun fires through the UK platoon creating a near miss condition
(Fig. 47).
Figure 47. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2056
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At 2102, after 32 seconds of line of sight to and six seconds of fire through the UK
platoon, the machine gunner recognizes the near miss situation and ceases fire (Fig 48
and 49).
Figure 48. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2102
Figure 49. Machinegun, 1 st Pltn., Co. B vs. 2d Pltn., UK Co.: 2102
e. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.
At 1900, 3d Squad, 1 st Platoon has stopped in a building while adajacent
1
st
Squad, 2d Platoon attacks to seize a nearby building (Figs. 50 and 51).
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Figure 50. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.: 1900
Figure 51. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.: 1900









































Figure 52. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.: 1927
At 1959, 1 st Squad, 2d Platoon observes and engages 3d Squad, 1 st Platoon creating a
near miss condition (Fig. 53).
Figure 53. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.: 1959
At 2001, two seconds after engaging, 1
st Squad, 2d Platoon determines the adjacent unit
to be friendly and ceases fires (Fig. 54).
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Figure 54. Co. B: 1st Sqd., 2d Pltn. vs. 3d Sqd., 1 st Pltn.: 2001
D. MOUT CONCLUSIONS
1. Position-Location Information
Standard position-location information (PLI) data, consisting of unit
identification, unit location, and time at location, appear to be satisfactory for maintaining
situational awareness in an urban environment.
2. Situational Awareness over Target Identification
Foot mobile entities move through the three dimensional urban terrain of the
MOUT scenario at normal and slower than normal infantry rate of movement. Although
the entities move more slowly in MOUT, their state changes occur more rapidly than in
the mixed and mountainous desert terrain scenarios. This is caused by personnel moving
from inside buildings, through building openings, into open spaces between buildings or
adjacent buildings in less than one second (the time it takes to walk or run through a
doorway). This state transition time is significant for the following reason. While a
building occupied by Marines is considered a friendly area, the streets, buildings, and
open areas adjacent to the building may by considered hostile areas. Tanks, AAAVs,
crew served weapons, and individual Marines may have line of sight and fields of fire in
these areas. The short duration windows of line of sight between entities occurring at
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very close range in the urban environment tends to create rapid fire-no-fire decision
situations. This short decision time may not be long enough for humans to wait for a
response from a target identification device. The short fire-no-fire decision time
combined with the rapid nature of entity state changes in an urban setting suggest a
situation awareness device may be more effective than a target identification device. A
situational awareness device would provide marines with warning of adjacent friendly
positions prior to the occurrence of an interaction. Instead of reacting to the situation,
Marines would be able to anticipate and intuit unfolding events.
3. Rate of Information Update
In order for a situational awareness device to provide adequate information, entity
positions must be updated frequently enough to account for rapid entity state changes.
An update rate of one to two seconds would be required to accurately reflect PLI for
MOUT.
4. Situational Awareness System Architecture and Deployment
The number of SA devices distributed to the force and the unit level to which they
are distributed will effect the system's architecture and the quality of SA information
provided. In an urban environment, the natural dispersal of entities at the individual,
single vehicle, crew served weapon, fire team, and squad level makes detail and high-
resolution important features in a SA system. For example, devices are deployed at the
squad level. A squad leader is equipped with a PLI transmit/receive device. His position
represents the location of all the Marines in his squad; however, the squad leader has two
fire teams in the building in which he is located and one fire team deployed across the
street. Other squads operating close by observe the squad leader's PLI in their system
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displays and treat his location as friendly. The area across the street is treated as hostile
because the fire team located there has no PLI transmitter and is therefore invisible to the
SA system. This idea is not trivial because it impacts the deployment and dispersal of SA
devices throughout the force. The smaller the unit equipped with SA transmitters and
receivers, the higher the detail and resolution of the system. The higher the detail and
resolution, the higher the utility of information provided to users.
In most operations, Marines are employed as squads, platoons, and companies;
however, individual Marines do occasionally separate from their unit, ether on an
assigned mission or inadvertently. Accordingly, in most situations, SA devices may be
distributed to squad, platoon, or even company level and relatively accurately represent
the PLI of the entire unit on a center of mass basis. In MOUT, however, the environment
disperses units into small groups of teams and individuals. This dispersal can
significantly decrease SA and increase fratricide as the MOUT scenario examples have
displayed. To reduce this problem in MOUT, SA devices should be deployed at the
lowest level possible.
Numerous architecture and deployment options exist ranging from equipping
every Marine with a device to only equipping platoons and higher units with devices.
One of the many other possibilities: deploy a mix of SA device types throughout the
force — some personnel and vehicles are be equipped with transmitters alone, while
others are be equipped with transmit/receive devices. Regardless of which system
architecture is deployed, some issues that should be considered in the deployment
decision follow.
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Equip every Marine with a SA device:
Every individual entity's PLI is displayed in the SA system. Every individual
will have access to a view of the battle space beyond their visual range. The
location of other adjacent friendly forces will be clearer to all individuals.
Marines SA will increase, individuals and units will possess an increased
ability to self organize their activity, and fratricide will likely decrease.
Individual rifleman will most likely be focussed on a weapon sight aperture
view of the battle space. A separate SA display would take an individual's
eyes away from his assigned sector of observation. Unless the two are
integrated for the individual, deployment of separate SA and TI systems at the
individual level will likely cause information overload of the rifleman and
may ultimately be less effective than use of a TI device alone.
In MOUT, Individuals will usually remain within verbal communication range
of team leaders.
Team leaders and higher unit leaders are more likely than individual riflemen
to have the time to frequently view a SA device.
Volume of data transmitted over the SA system network is large if every
individual entity transmits and receives PLI.
SA displays become cluttered with entity PLI and difficult to read because of
the large number of entity PLI reports displayed.
Equip only unit leaders with SA devices:
Unit leader's PLI is displayed in the SA system.
SA displays are less cluttered with PLI reports and present a cleaner view to
users.
Volume of data transmitted over the SA system network is much smaller than
a system in which every individual entity transmits and receives PLI.
In MOUT, a large number of entity positions go unreported; as a result, the
SA system is unreliable because it lacks detail and resolution.
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Equip individuals with transmit devices and unit leaders with transmit/receive
SA devices:
All individuals input data into the SA system; as a result, leader SA of his, and
adjacent unit entities is high.
Leaders verbally pass SA information to individuals within their unit.
Individuals use the information received verbally to increase their personal
SA, anticipate interactions, and augment TI devices.
Redundancy is introduced into PLI reporting. If one individual's device fails,
as long as he is in the vicinity of at least one other Marine, unit dispositions
displayed in the system will remain accurate.
Volume of data transmitted over the SA system network is much smaller than
a system in which every individual entity transmits and receives PLI but larger
than a system that equips only unit leaders.
SA displays are cluttered and difficult to read because of the large number of
entity PLI reports displayed.
Trade-offs between these possible system implementations must be balanced
against the level of SA desired. Clearly in MOUT, higher detail is required for a SA
system to be effective.
5. Resolution of Information
After observation of the MOUT simulation, it appears the capabilities required for
CID SA system performance, as specified by the Marine Corps Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) for CID, may be inadequate for urban terrain [Ref. 5].
The ORD requires a CID SA system component to resolve entities separated by 200m
(threshold) and 100m (objective) with the requirement further specified for dismounted
infantry to 100m (threshold) and 25m (objective). This resolution distance is acceptable
for most operations. For MOUT, these distances are inadequate for the detail of the
terrain. In the majority of European, Asian, and 3rd world nations, the dimensions of
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most buildings are estimated to be less than 25m in size and most roads and streets less
than 25m in width. Accuracy of 25m for personnel does not resolve if the Marine is
standing in a building or out in the street. This could mean the difference between
treatment as hostile or friendly in a CED SA system. Further, in MOUT Marines are
likely to operate with armored and other vehicle support. Consequently, resolution for
vehicles must be similar to that of personnel for a SA system to function effectively in
MOUT.
A resolvable distance of less than 25m is of particular importance as digital-
mapping technology improves in the near future. Present digital mapping capability
allows high resolution to fine detail of building size and location. This capability is
already in use in commercial rental cars equipped with navigational equipment. This
equipment presents a digital route map display, written directions, audible instructions to
alert drivers as they approach turns, and identification of arrival at a specific street
address (a resolution less than 25m). Additional enhancements to digital mapping
include rapid map update through the intelligence process and enhanced satellite imagery,
improvements to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and construction of follow-on
systems, and the ability to zoom between low resolution (large map scale) and extremely
high resolution (small map scale). This zoom capability already exists as well in
commercial software and web applications like Mapquest.com.
The resolvable distance for MOUT should, at a minimum, account for GPS (or
other PLI system inherent accuracy and the size of buildings and width of roads in the
most likely areas for future urban operations. Based on these factors and current
technology, a more appropriate minimum resolvable distance to accurately provide SA
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would be a threshold of 25m to 50m and objective of 5m to 15m. These distances apply
to both personnel and vehicles.
6. Entity Display Aggregation
Entity display aggregation refers to the level of unit PLI detail displayed by a SA
system. This aggregation could range from the display of all individuals within a unit to
only the unit. De-aggregation accomplishes the opposite effect and allows a user to
resolve unit PLI icons into finer levels of granularity for more detailed depiction of entity
locations. Examples of unit aggregation and de-aggregation are provided in Figures 55
through 59. These examples show aggregated unit positions based on the unit leader's
PLI.
Figure 55. Company Aggregation of Entities
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Figure 57. Squad De-aggregation of Entities
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Figure 58. Team De-aggregation of Entities
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Figure 59. Individual De-aggregation of Entities
It is clear, from the series of images in figures 55 through 59, that the highest SA
of accurate entity location in an urban setting is achieved by de-aggregation to the
individual level. This level of detail is cumbersome however, when viewing higher scale
maps and large areas. The ability to aggregate and de-aggregate units allow a SA device
user to clean-up his display and, with the addition of a zoom capability, focus on that
level of resolution appropriate for his area of interest and required view.
7. Aviation Information
Aviation caused no near miss or fratricide incidents in the MOUT scenario.
However, the many friendly units in the scenario over-fired by aviation ordnance (Fig.
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20), combined with the tendency for rotary wing CAS aircraft rounds to impact short and
long along the weapon-target line, suggest that near miss and fratricide incidents are
likely in real situations of CAS employment in MOUT. This suggests that a SA system
depicting the accurate location of personnel in urban areas would be useful to aircrews.
Additionally, PLI of rotary wing CAS aircraft would be valuable to ground entities to
identify situations in which they are located on an aircraft's weapon-target line or in the
aircraft's weapon hazard area.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the MOUT scenario simulation, presented
observations of the interaction of virtual forces, and drawn conclusions about the SA data
requirements when operating in an urban environment. The following chapters will
discuss the other simulated scenarios conducted for this thesis.
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V. MIXED TERRAIN SCENARIO
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents information about the mixed terrain scenario. Notes on the
scenario terrain, forces, and concept of operation are outlined along with simulation




The scenario is centered along a main supply route (MSR) between urban areas.
The MSR follows an avenue of approach that is oriented North-South, paralleling a small
river. High ground with numerous tree lines, hilltops, and wooded areas overlooks the
MSR. Several company and platoon size mobility corridors cross the terrain and provide
small-unit access to bypass the MSR. Figure 60 provides a view of the terrain map used
in the scenario.
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Figure 60. Mixed Terrain Scenario Map
2. Forces
a. Friendly Force Composition
The Marine force in the mixed terrain scenario is a task organized
MAGTF. A standard table of organization and equipment was used to organize the force.
Exceptions were made to force composition in cases where new equipment is expected to
replace current systems. The following general task organization outlines the
composition of Marine forces for this scenario.
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Ground Combat Element:
Reinforced Mechanized Infantry Battalion Team:
Battalion Forward Command Post
Combat Train
MlAl Tank Company Team; Infantry Detached
AAAV Equipped Mechanized Infantry Company Team; Infantry
reattached from the Tank Team
Anti Armor Platoon
Heavy Machine Gun Platoon
Mortar Platoon
Obstacle Clearing Detachment (Combat Engineer Detachment)
Air Defense Detachment
Helicopter-borne Task Force (HTF):
Rifle Company
Attached Crew-Served Weapons
Light Armored Reconnaissance Company
Artillery Battalion
Detachment, Battalion Fire Direction Center
Two Lightweight Howitzer Batteries





Three Sections Rotary Wing Close Air Support (RW CAS)
Five Sections Fixed Wing CAS (FW CAS)
Three sections VMFA
Two Sections VMA
Marine forces are organized and equipped according to Marine Corps
doctrine. The simulation begins with the Marine force across the line of departure,
infantry elements closing on the final coordination line, and the helicopter-borne task
force landing at L-hour.
b. Coalition Force Composition
An infantry company supported by Fox vehicles and a 60mm mortar
section represents the coalition force. Platoons assigned to the company were organized
smaller than their Marine counterparts and consist of 23 soldiers each. The coalition
force begins the scenario at its line of departure.
c. Enemy Force Composition
A BMP-2 equipped mechanized infantry company, T-80 equipped tank
platoon, BRDM-2 equipped reconnaissance platoon, BTR-70 equipped infantry platoon,
and 2S1 equipped artillery battery comprise the enemy force.
3. Concept of Operations
The enemy force is deployed in a defensive posture along the avenue of approach
in order to block Marine and coalition force movement South. The enemy defends with
the mechanized infantry company, reinforced with tanks and the reconnaissance platoon.
The separate infantry platoon defends a prominent mobility corridor East of the main
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defense. An overview of the enemy positions is provided in Figure 61. Figure 62 shows
the details of the enemy force positions.
Figure 6 1 . Mixed Terrain Enemy Overview
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Figure 62. Mixed Terrain Enemy Defensive Positions
Figure 63 provides an overview of the entire concept of operations for both
Marine and coalition forces.
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Figure 63. Mixed Terrain Overall Concept of Operations
The information that follows provides the details of each task organized maneuver
unit's scheme of maneuver.
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Figure 64. Mixed Terrain LAR Concept of Operations
The HTF (Company L) attacks to clear the West side of the river and support the






















Figure 65. Mixed Terrain HTF Concept of Operations
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Figure 66. Mixed Terrain Detailed HTF Scheme of Maneuver
The Marine Battalion attacks to clear the enemy to the East of the river and open the
MSR (Fig. 67).
Figure 67. Mixed Terrain Battalion Concept of Operations
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The battalion is task organized into support-force 1, support-force 2, and the main effort.
Support-force 1 is made up of the tank company headquarters, one platoon of tanks, two
sections of Tow missile systems, and two sections of heavy machine guns. Support-force
1 attacks by fire to allow support-force 2 to gain position. Support-force 2 is made up of
two tank platoons, one section of Tow missile systems, and one section of heavy machine
guns. Support-force 2 attacks by fire to support the main effort's attack to clear enemy
from the East side of the river. Figure 68 provides an overview of the scheme of
maneuver for support-forces 1 and 2.
Figure 68. Mixed Terrain Support-Force 1 and 2
The mechanized company (Company A) is the main effort. The main effort attacks to
clear the enemy position East of the river and establishes a blocking position to the South
(Figs. 69 and 70).
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Figure 69. Mixed Terrain Main Effort, Overview
Figure 70. Mixed Terrain Main Effort, Detail
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The coalition force attacks to clear a route to the East of the Marines (Figs. 71 and 72).
Figure 71. Mixed Terrain Coalition, Overview
Figure 72. Mixed Terrain Coalition, Detail
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4. Simulation Parameters
Parameters set to establish the baseline conditions for the scenario include the
following. The simulation was constructed to represent an attack commencing at 0800,
on a clear, sunny day. No battlefield obscuration was employed. The Janus fratricide
capability was enabled and the firing criterion for all Marine and coalition forces was set
to recognition. Groups were set at the platoon level. Again, it was assumed that the net
effect, of recognition firing criteria and platoon grouping, on total fratricidal interactions
was negligible.
C. SCENARIO RESULTS
1. Fratricide Enabled vs. Disabled
Again, for comparison, two runs of the scenario where conducted. In both runs,
all parameters were set identically except the fratricide capability. A general comparison
of the interactions that occurred in the two mixed terrain scenario runs is presented in
Table 5. Comparison of the interactions within units and between adjacent units is
presented. The number of occurrences and type of interaction is presented for each
situation as well. As was evident from the previous MOUT scenario comparison, the
number of near miss and fratricidal interactions suggest a significant possibility of
fratricide exists in a mixed terrain situation. The remainder of results presented in this
chapter will cover the fratricide enabled scenario run.
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Comparison between Mixed Terrain Fratricide Enabled and Disabled Simulation
Runs
Unit Fratricide Disabled Run Fratricide Enabled Run
Within Unit
Support-Force 1 (SF 1) Nx 1
Support-Force 2 (SF 2) Nx3
Helicopter-borne Task Force (HTF) Nx6 Nx5
Obstacle Clearing Detachment (OCD)
Battalion Mortars (81s)
Main Effort, Co. A (A) Fx6
Screening Force, LAR Co. (LAR) Nx2
UK Co. (UK) Nx2
Aviation Nxl Fx 1
Between Units
SF 1 - HTF Nx4
SF 1 - SBF 2 Nx l,Fx7
SF1-A Nx 1
SF 2 - OCD Fx2
SF 2 - HTF Nx2
SF2-A Fx2
SF2-81S Fx2
A -HTF Nx2 Nx2
A -LAR Fx 1
USMC - UK
LAR - HTF Fx4





USMC+UK: Nx 1 8, Fx31
F = Fratricide Interaction N = Near Miss Interaction
Table 5. Comparison of Mixed Fratricide Enabled and Disabled Simulations
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2. General Observations
During the attack on the enemy positions East of the river, units of the main effort
were not able to maintain a high level of SA of adjacent Marine units. Apparently, this
condition occurred because the wooded terrain over which the attacked was conducted
afforded little line of sight of adjacent units and enemy positions. Nine incidents of
fratricide and one near miss incident occurred as a result.
The rolling terrain that units of support-force 2 attacked across led to their
disorientation and engagement of support-force 1. The result was seven fratricidal and
one near miss interaction.
The restrictive line of sight windows through the hills and vegetation impacted air
defense units' ability to correctly identify rotary wing aircraft. Two aircraft were
engaged and destroyed as a result.
The close proximity of friendly and enemy ground forces created a situation in
which aviation directly attacked ground entities, or placed them well within aviation
ordnance hazard areas, on four near miss and six fratricidal occasions.
The avenue of approach in which the enemy defended was four Kilometers across
at its widest point. The terrain slopes upward relatively steeply on both sides of the
corridor at this point. The relatively steep slope of the terrain along the sides of the
corridor allowed FW CAS aircrews only a very short period of observation in which to
acquire specific enemy entities and release bombs before the target area was over-flown.
Laser-guided, precision munitions (PGMs) could reduce this problem; however, PGMs
are expected to continue to be a limited resource. This difficulty to acquire targets
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combined with the close nature of the vegetation and terrain created a situation, in which
a FW CAS aircraft engaged and destroyed a RW CAS aircraft.
3. Entity Interaction Overview
Figures 73 through 80 chart the type of interaction (N = near miss, F = fratricide)
and simulation time of each interaction within and between units. On all charts, shooters
are plotted on the Y-axis, while targets are plotted on the X-axis. Where no interactions
took place between units, no chart is provided.
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 73. Mixed—Interactions within Company L (HTF)
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N: Near Miss F: Fratricide
Figure 74. Mixed—Interactions within Support-Force 1
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Figure 75. Mixed—Interactions within Support-Force 2
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Figure 77. Mixed—Interactions among Aircraft
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Figure 79. Mixed—Interactions between Units
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Figure 80. Mixed—Interactions between Units, Continued
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The previous figures show a significant number of near miss and fratricide
interactions between entities (18 near miss, 31 fratricide). Two fratricidal ground to air
interactions occurred resulting in two lost aircraft. Four fratricidal and four near miss air
to ground interactions occurred. The air to ground interactions resulted in three LAVs
and one AAAV destroyed and an uncounted number of Marines killed.
4. Example Interactions
Seven typical interactions are presented as examples to provide a feel for how
interactions between units in mixed terrain might unfold over time.
a. RW CAS vs. Air Defense
At simulation time 0006, a section of RW CAS aircraft proceed along
their route to attack position 1 (AP 1) (Fig. 81).
Figure 81. RW CAS vs. Air Defense: 0006
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The aircraft are terrain masked from the air defense unit (Fig. 82).
Figure 82. RW CAS vs. Air Defense: 0006
The aircraft move through intermittent line of sight with the Avenger air defense system
for 50 seconds, between 0010 and 0100 (Fig. 83), at which time they arrive at their AP.
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Figure 83. RW CAS vs. Air Defense: 0100
The aircraft remain in their AP from 0100 until 0203 (1:03 elapsed) when they are
acquired and engaged by the Avenger (Fig. 84). One aircraft is destroyed.
Figure 84. RW CAS vs. Air Defense: 0203
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b. FW CAS vs. Co. A
A section of VMFA, FW CAS aircraft are inbound on an attack of an
enemy position East of the river (Fig. 85).
Figure 85. FW CAS vs. Co. A: 0136
The aircraft acquire Company A instead of the enemy and drop ordnance in the vicinity
of the company command post. One AAAV is destroyed (Fig. 86).
Figure 86. FW CAS vs. Co. A: 0140
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c. Tow, SF 2 vs. Tank, SF 2
During the unit movement to support by fire position 1, The 3d Tow
Section observes a target. The Tows have no line of sight to the 2d Tank Platoon
advancing on their right (Fig. 87).
Figure 87. Tow, SF 2 vs. Tank, SF 2: 1450
At 1451, the Tow section engages a target to its right and over-fires the tank platoon (Fig.
88).
Figure 88. Tow, SF 2 vs. Tank, SF 2: 145
1
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d. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA
At 1600, as Company A conducts an attack on enemy positions East of the
river, a section of FW CAS aircraft are inbound to a target in the vicinity of Company A
(Fig. 89).
Figure 89. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA: 1600
The aircraft are unaware of the active mortar mission Company A is conducting on the
enemy positions along the route of flight (note the mortar weapon-target line) (Fig. 90).
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Figure 90. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA: 1600
The aircraft make their attack run on the target at 1657 and hazard Company A by the
attack heading (Fig. 91). Mortar impacts can be observed in the target area at the same
time (Fig. 92).
Figure 91. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA: 1657
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Figure 92. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA: 1708
At 1720, the aircraft cross the trajectory and weapon-target line of the active mortar
mission; mortar rounds are in the same airspace as the aircraft (Fig. 93).
Figure 93. Mortar Sec, Co. A vs. VMFA: 1720
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e. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A
1
st
and 2d Platoons, Company A attack toward enemy positions at 2115.
The platoons do no have line of sight to each other (Fig. 94).
Figure 94. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 21 15
At 2214 the 1 st platoon leaves the trees and is engaged by the enemy (Fig. 95).
Figure 95. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 2214
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At 2222, 2d Platoon, Company A exits the trees, observes both the enemy and 1 st
Platoon, misidentifies 1
st
Platoon as enemy, and engages (Fig. 96).
Figure 96. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 2222
Two minutes pass while a fight between the enemy, 1 st Platoon, and 2d Platoon develops.
Throughout this fight, both the enemy and 2d Platoon engage 1st Platoon (Fig. 97).
Figure 97. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 2422
Entities in 1
st
Platoon return fire at 2d Platoon at 2540 (Fig. 98).
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Figure 98. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 2540
Sporadic fire continues to be exchanged between 1 st and 2d Platoons, resulting in several
casualties (Fig. 99).
Figure 99. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 2916
The fire between the Marine platoons ceases at 3200, after 9:38 of fire between the two
Marine platoons (Fig. 100).
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Figure 100. 2d Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. A: 3200
/. 2d Pltn., LAR Co. vs. 3d Pltn., Co. A
By 10500, 3d Platoon, Company A has established a blocking position
along the East side of the river, overlooking the MSR. To the Southwest, the 2d Platoon,
LAR Company advances toward its next over-watch position (Fig. 101).
Figure 101. 2d Pltn., LAR Co. vs. 3d Pltn., Co. A: 10500
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At 10543, the LAR platoon arrives at its position. From this position, line of sight exists
to 3d Platoon, Company A (Fig. 102).
Figure 102. 2d Pltn., LAR Co. vs. 3d Pltn., Co. A: 10543
After 2:24 of observation, LAR detects the infantry platoon, determins it to be hostile,
and engages. The LAR continue engaging for 2:06 before determining the infantry to be
friendly and ceasing fire (Fig. 103).
Figure 103. 2d Pltn., LAR Co. vs. 3d Pltn., Co. A: 10807
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D. MIXED TERRAIN SCENARIO CONCLUSIONS
1. Aircrew Situational Awareness
FW aircraft in the scenario were particularly lethal to ground and RW entities.
Unlike the MOUT scenario, entities were not protected by buildings and other man made
features from aviation observation, targeting, and weapons effects. Consequently, SA
displays for FW and RW aircrews that contain accurate ground entity and RW aircraft
PLI would be required to reduce air to ground fratricidal interactions. The PLI displayed
to the aircrews would not prevent misidentification of friendly as enemy: however, it
would alert the aircrews to the presence, disposition, and proximity to the target of
friendly personnel. Aircrews then would be better able to orient their attack to prevent
the effects of their ordnance from affecting adjacent friendly entities.
2. Resolution of Information
Resolvable distances, as stipulated by Reference 5, appear satisfactory for a SA
device used in a mixed terrain environment.
3. Aircrew Artillery and Mortar Situational Awareness
FW CAS aircraft flew through the Company A mortar weapon-target line during
the scenario. Indirect fire support forward observers, forward air controllers, and fire
support coordination personnel establish control measures and coordinating instructions
for combined arms fire support employment. However, the high speed of aircraft, high
pilot workload in the cockpit, and difficulty of acquiring the correct target in the target
area make following all control and coordinating measures difficult. A display of the
active indirect fire mission weapon-target lines on aircrew SA devices would enhance
108
pilots ability to avoid the danger of crossing the flight path of ordnance, especially rifle
company mortars.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the mixed terrain scenario simulation, presented
observations of the interaction of virtual forces, and drawn conclusions about the SA data
requirements when operating in this type environment. The following chapter will
discuss the final simulation, the mountainous desert scenario.
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VI. MOUNTAINOUS DESERT TERRAIN SCENARIO
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents information about the mountainous desert terrain scenario.
Notes on the scenario terrain, forces, and concept of operation are outlined along with
simulation parameters. Observations of the simulation are presented and conclusions are
drawn from the observations.
B. SCENARIO NOTES
1. Terrain
This scenario is set in a high desert environment with little vegetation. The area
of operations is crossed West to East by three large avenues of approach. The northern
and Southern avenues average four kilometers in width while the middle avenue averages
six kilometers in width. North-South mobility corridors interconnect the three West-East
corridors at the edges of the area of operations. The three corridors are separated by
mountain ranges. The most prominent terrain in the area is a mountain peak in the center
of the scenario terrain map. Figure 104 provides an overview of the terrain map used in
this scenario.
Ill
Figure 104. Mountainous Desert Terrain Overview
2. Forces
a. Friendly Force Composition
The Marine force in the mountainous desert scenario is a task organized
MAGTF of MEB strength. The MEB was organized for employment as an operational
maneuver element, operating from a sea-base of amphibious shipping. A standard table
of organization and equipment was used to organize the force. Exceptions were made to
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force composition in cases where new equipment is expected to replace current systems.
All systems that would be required to conduct sustained operations ashore are included in
the task organization of the MEB; however, the size and composition of logistics units
has been reduced to account for future improved ship to shore logistics delivery methods.
The following general task organization outlines the composition of MEB used for this
scenario.
Command Element:
MEB "Jump" Command Post (Commander, Operations Officer)
MEB Forward Command Post (Main Command Post Remains
Shipboard)
Three Communications Retransmission Sections
MEB Combat Train (Small, to Support the Command Element)
Aviation Combat Element:
Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron (12 Aircraft)
Detachment, Fighter-Attack, All Weather (VMFA-AW) Squadron (6
Aircraft)
Attack (VMA) Squadron (12 Aircraft)
Unmanned Air Reconnaissance (VMU) Squadron (6 Unmanned Air
Reconnaissance Aircraft)
Light Attack (HMLA) Squadron (12 AH1Y Attack Helicopters and 12
UH1Z Utility Helicopters)
Two Medium Assault Support (HMM and VMM) Squadrons (12
Medium Assault Support Helicopters and 12 Tilt Rotor Aircraft)
Heavy Assault Support (HMH) Squadron (12 Heavy Assault Support
Helicopters)
Combat Service Support Element:
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Logistics Train, Including Armor Maintenance and Support Equipment
Logistics Train, Direct Support of Ground Combat Element
Logistics Train, General Support of MEB
Ground Combat Element:
Regimental Forward Command Post (7th Mar.)
Regimental Main Command Post
Tow Anti Tank Missile Platoon
Regimental Combat Train
Three Communications Retransmission Sections
Mechanized Battalion Task Force (1 st Bn., 7th Mar.):
Forward Command Post
Main Command Post
Tank Company Team (MlAl and AAAV)
Mechanized Company Team (Co. A) (AAAV and M1A1)
Mechanized Company (Co. B) (AAAV)
Anti Armor Platoon (TOW Missiles and Heavy Machine Guns)
Mortar Platoon
Engineer Platoon
Mine Clearing Platoon (AAAV)
Two Combat Trains
Two Communications Retransmission Sections
Mechanized Infantry Battalion (3d Bn., 7 th Mar.):
Forward Command Post
Main Command Post
Two Mechanized Companies (Co. I and Co. K) (AAAV )
Anti Armor Platoon (TOW Missiles and Heavy Machine Guns)
Mortar Platoon
Two Combat Trains
Two Communications Retransmission Sections






Heavy Machine Gun Squad
Two Sections FW CAS





Two Communications Retransmission Sections






Three Lightweight Howitzer Batteries (155mm)
Rocket Artillery Battery (MLRS)
Three Survey Parties
Three Counter-Battery Radar Teams
Two Combat Trains
Light Armored Reconnaissance Company
Engineer Company
Reconnaissance Company
b. Coalition Force Composition
A U.K. mechanized infantry battalion is the coalition force used in the




Three Infantry Companies (Equipped with FOX Vehicles)
Combat Train
c. Enemy Force Composition
The Enemy force used on the scenario is composed of the following
elements:
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Anti Armor Platoon (BRDM-AT)




Three Mechanized Infantry Companies (BMP-2)





Three Self-propelled Howitzer Batteries (2S 1)
Two Rocket Artillery Batteries (BM-21)
One Counter-Battery Radar Team
Two Logistics Trains
Separate Tank Company (T-80)
Separate Mechanized Infantry Platoon (BTR-70)
Separate Reconnaissance Platoon, Reinforced (BRDM-2 and T-80)
Separate Reconnaissance Company (BRDM-2 and BRDM-AT)
3. Concept of Operations
The enemy force defends along the central avenue of approach with tanks and
mechanized infantry, reinforced with artillery and the separate tank company in reserve
(Figs. 105, 106 and 107).
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Figure 105. Desert Terrain Enemy Situation Overview
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Figure 106. Desert Terrain Enemy Main Defense
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Figure 107. Desert Terrain Enemy Main Defense Detail
The Northern avenue of approach and flank of the enemy battalion is defended by the
separate reconnaissance platoon and a tank platoon (Figs. 108 and 109).
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Figure 108. Desert Terrain Enemy North Defense
Figure 109. Desert Terrain Enemy North Defense Detail
The Southern avenue and flank of the battalion is defended by the separate infantry
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Figure 1 10. Desert Terrain Enemy South Defense
To the East of the separate infantry platoon, the reconnaissance company screens in zone
(Fig. 111).
Figure 111. Desert Terrain Enemy Reconnaissance Company
121
The U. K. coalition force attacks to clear the Northern avenue of approach by a
two company dismounted attack (Figs. 112 and 1 13).
Figure 112. Desert Terrain UK Battalion Attack Overview
Figure 113. Desert Terrain UK Battalion Attack Detail
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The Marine forces attack to destroy the enemy reserve tank company, clear the
separate infantry platoon defensive position and screening force in the South avenue of
approach, and destroy the enemy in the central avenue of approach. Specific unit tasks
include:
The helicopter-borne task force (HTF) clears the enemy platoon defending the
Southern avenue of approach (Figs. 1 14 and 1 15).
Figure 1 14. Desert Terrain HTF Attack Overview
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Figure 115. Desert Terrain HTF Attack Detail
LAR screens to the in the Southern avenue and links-up with the helicopter-
borne force (Fig 116).
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Figure 116. Desert Terrain LAR Screen
The mechanized battalion task force attacks to clear the Southern half of the
main enemy defensive position (Figs. 117 and 118).
Figure 1 17. Desert Terrain USMC Main Attack Overview
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Figure 118. Desert Terrain Mechanized Battalion Task Force (1/7) Attack
The mechanized infantry battalion attacks to clear the Northern half of the
main enemy defensive position (Figs. 1 17 and 1 19).
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Figure 119. Desert Terrain Mechanized Battalion (3/7) Attack
4. Simulation Parameters
Parameters set to establish the baseline conditions for the scenario include the
following. The simulation was constructed to represent an attack commencing at 0800,
on a clear, sunny day. No battlefield obscuration was employed; however, to more
accurately simulate desert conditions, vehicle, aircraft, and personnel movement
generated dust was enabled. Fratricide was disabled. All entities were required to
identify targets prior to engagement.
5. Fratricide Disabled Constraint
The mountainous desert scenario models a large scale, high intensity, brigade size
operation. As a result of the size and scope of the scenario, the model contains over 3000
entities. The number of workstations available was not sufficient to adequately run this
large scenario in a fratricide-enabled mode. Consequently, fratricide was disabled and no
scenario generated, direct fratricidal interactions occurred. All observations were made
from this fratricide-disabled scenario model. No comparison of fratricide enabled versus
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fratricide disabled results could be made; however, many near miss interactions where
observed in the scenario and used as the basis for conclusions.
C. SCENARIO RESULTS
1. General Mountainous Desert Observations
The Mountains that separated the corridors generally blocked cross-corridor line
of sight between units. This reduced the potential for cross-corridor interaction between
units and near miss or fratricide. In the few windows of visibility that permitted cross-
corridor line of sight, the potential for and occurrence of near miss (and likely fratricide)
increased. Within corridors, there was a tendency for entities to focus on the nearest
targets and fire across or through adjacent units during target engagement. This type of
cross-unit engagement would likely result in near miss and fratricide incidents in a real
battlefield situation. A total of 48 near miss incidents were observed during the scenario.
2. Entity Interaction Overview
Figures 120 through 132 chart the type of interaction (N = near miss) and
simulation time of each interaction within and between units. On all charts, shooters are
plotted on the Y-axis, while targets are plotted on the X-axis. Where no interactions took
place between units, no chart is provided.
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Figure 120. Desert—Interactions Within HTF (L/3/7)
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Figure 121. Desert—Interactions Within LAR Co.
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Figure 122. Desert—Interactions Between HTF and LAR Co.
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Figure 123. Desert—Interactions Within Co. B
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Figure 124. Desert—Interactions Within Co. A
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VMFA Section Re-attacks Enemy BM-21 Battery on a Final Attack
Heading Along the Weapon Target Line Of the MLRS Battery During an
Active Fire Mission; Aircraft Occupy the Same Air Space as Ordnance
Trajectory.
HMLA Section Engages Dismounted Infantry From the 1 st UK Company
with 20 mm Gun.
1:56:05
HMLA Section Engages Enemy, Over-firing Elements of Companies A and
B; Approximately 5 Missiles Fired.
HMLA Section Engages Enemy, Over-firing Elements of Company B;
Approximately, 10 Missiles Fired.
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Figure 127. Desert—Interactions Between Units, Part 1
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Interactions Between Units
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Figure 130. Desert—Interactions Between Units, Part 4
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Interactions Between Units
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Sqd. vs. 2d Sqd., Co. L (HTF)
Attacking squads advance on enemy positions while blocked from line of
sight of each other by the terrain (Fig. 133). A line of sight fan of the squads is
superimposed in Figure 134.
Figure 133. 1
st
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Figure 134. 1 st Sqd. vs. 2d Sqd., Co. L (HTF): 12944
As the engagement of the enemy position on the hilltop between the two squads unfolds,
the squads continue to advance with no line of sight of each other (Fig. 135).
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Figure 135. 1 st Sqd. vs. 2d Sqd., Co. L (HTF): 13101
If the squads continue to advance they will enter each other's fields of fire.
b. 3d Pltn. vs. AT Sec, LAR Co.
As the LAR platoon advances across the ridgeline, it has no line of sight
of the enemy vehicle or the LAR company logistics train to the North (Figs. 136 and
137).
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Figure 136. 3d Pltn. vs. AT Sec, LAR Co.: 1 1212
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Figure 137. 3d Pltn. vs. AT Sec, LAR Co.: 1 1212
The LAR platoon engages the enemy vehicle as soon as line of sight to the enemy vehicle
is established. The logistics train is in the danger area of the LAR platoon's fires (Fig.
138).
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Figure 138. 3d Pltn. vs. AT Sec, LAR Co.: 11441
c. LAR Co. vs. 2d Pltn., Co. L
The LAR platoon observes the enemy position and engages as the 2d
Platoon, Company L assaults the same position from the oposite direction. 2d Platoon is
in the target area of the LAR paltoon's fires (Fig. 139).
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Figure 139. LAR Co. vs. 2d Pltn., Co. L: 1 1707
d. RW CAS vs. 1 st U.K. Co.
As a section of RW CAS aircraft move along their route to an attack
position, an infantry unit in the vicinity of a known enemy position is observed and
engaged. The unit is the 1 st U.K. Company (Fig. 140).
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Figure 140. RW CAS vs. 1 st U.K. Co.: 05633
e. Co. B Hdqts. vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. B
The Company Headquarters AAAV engages an enemy position by firing
across the AAAVs of 1 st Platoon. The fire hazards 1 st Platoon (Fig. 141).
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Figure 141. Co. B Hdqts. vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. B: 10527
/. AAAV vs. Infantry and 2d Pltn., Co. B
The 2d Squad, 1 st Platoon, Company B AAAV engages an enemy position
by firing through dismounted infantry in the area. The fires are oriented toward the 3d
Platoon's AAAVs. This fire endangers both the dismounted infantry and AAAVs (Fig.
142).
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Figure 142. AAAV vs. Infantry and 2d Pltn., Co. B: 10744
g. Converging Fires and 1 st Pltn., Co. B
Elements of Company B converge fires on an enemy position. This fire
endangers numerous AAAVs and dismounted infantry in the area (Fig. 143).
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Figure 143. Converging Fires and 1 st Pltn., Co. B: 10648
h. RWCASvs.Co.B
RW CAS aircraft fire several missiles over Company B while engaging
enemy. This fire hazards the company (Fig. 144).
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Figure 144. RW CAS vs. Co. B: 14934
i. Trench Clearing and Co. A
During trench clearing operations, the conditions become nearly as
dynamic as those in a MOUT environment. Friendly and enemy infantry and infantry
fighting vehicles move in close proximity to one another. Infantry clearing enemy
trenches are not visible to adjacent and supporting friendly elements. Fires tend to
converge and the situation becomes extremely unclear (Fig. 145).
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Figure 145. Trench Clearing and Co. A: 14305
j. 1
st
Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. K
1
st
Platoon, Company A engages enemy from its support-by-fire position
to neutralize enemy positions and allow Company K to assault across open terrain. 1 st
Platoon's fires are oriented in a manner that endangers 1 st Platoon, Company K (Fig.
146).
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Figure 146. 1 st Pltn., Co. A vs. 1 st Pltn., Co. K: 20854
D. MOUNTAINOUS DESERT CONCLUSIONS
1. Resolution of Information
Resolvable distances, as stipulated by Reference 5, appear satisfactory for a SA
device used in a mountainous desert environment or situation in which large scale
operations are conducted.
2. Association of Actual Entity Location to PLI
While SA allows entities to anticipate upcoming interactions, the sheer number of
adjacent entities in an observer's field of view make associating an entities PLI on a SA
display, with an observed entity position on the ground, extremely difficult. This process
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can occur in situations where dozens of friendly vehicles and personnel are moving while
interspersed with enemy forces. Sorting the entities observed into friend (as identified by
PLI in a SA device), enemy as identified by visual identification, and unknown is a
difficult process that is prone to human error. This problem is reduced if terrain features
facilitate the association of PLI with an entity position on the ground. In a flat,
featureless desert, associating entities to PLI could be extremely difficult. A weapon
sight mounted target identification (TI) system could significantly mitigate the entity
location-PLI association problem by identifying targets as weapon operators sight them.
TI information, in this situation, would significantly enhance SA information.
3. Converging Fires and Maneuver
As units approached enemy fortifications, they tended to converge on the
positions. As units continued to advance, fires oriented on the enemy began to
encompass adjacent units. Many near miss incidents (and likely fratricide on an actual
battlefield) were observed in the scenario as a result of this trend. A SA device could
alert unit leaders to the development of this situation and allow them to prevent their
unit's fires from converging onto adjacent units.
4. Clearing Enemy Fortifications
The activity observed in this scenario was fast paced. Units covered much
distance in a short period of time. Although the tempo was high, entity state changes
unfolded much more slowly than in a MOUT environment. Accordingly, PLI update at
100m intervals and entity resolution as stipulated in Reference 5 would be satisfactory to
maintain an accurate depiction of the disposition of forces in the battle space. The slower
rate of state change holds true in this scenario until infantry dismounts to clear enemy
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positions. During dismounted trench clearing operations, conditions approach those of
MOUT. In order to maintain an accurate depiction of the battle space while enemy
fortifications are cleared, PLI update and resolution must increase to nearly that described
for MOUT. A resolution to 10m and approximately three to five second update rate
would be needed to account for the close quarter, subterranean battle in the fortified
enemy positions.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the mountainous desert scenario simulation, presented
observations of the interaction of virtual forces, and drawn conclusions about the SA data
requirements when operating in this type environment. The following chapter will
discuss conclusions and recommendations based upon the three simulations conducted.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were synthesized from the observations of the MOUT,
mixed terrain, and mountainous desert terrain scenario simulations:
Standard position-location information (PLI) data appears to be satisfactory
for maintaining situational awareness in urban, mixed terrain, and
mountainous desert environments.
An update rate of one to two seconds would be required to accurately reflect
PLI for MOUT.
SA information is more important than TI information in MOUT.
In MOUT, a high level of detail and resolution is required for a SA system to
be effective. SA devices should be deployed at the lowest level possible;
equipping individuals with SA transmitters would provide the most accurate
depiction of the disposition of forces in an urban battle space.
In order to most accurately provide SA in an urban environment and capitalize
on current and developing technology, a minimum resolvable distance
threshold of 25m to 50m and objective of 5m to 15m should be sought. These
distances apply for both personnel and vehicles.
SA devices used in MOUT should have the ability to aggregate and de-
aggregate units and zoom to a level of resolution appropriate for the user's
area of interest and required view.
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Resolvable distances, as stipulated by Reference 5, appear satisfactory for a
SA device used in mixed terrain, mountainous desert terrain, or situations in
which large scale operations are conducted.
During dismounted trench-clearing operations, a resolution to 10m and an
update rate of approximately three to five seconds is required.
SA devices could alert unit leaders to the development of converging fire and
cross-fire situations.
In conditions in which an observer's FOV is filled with many friendly and
enemy entities who are intermixed, moving quickly, and not located on
obvious terrain, TI is required to assist the observer in sorting friend from
enemy.
A SA system depicting the accurate location of personnel in urban areas
would be useful to aircrews. Additionally, PLI of rotary wing CAS aircraft
would be valuable to ground entities to identify situations in which they are
located on an aircraft's weapon-target line or in the aircraft's weapon hazard
area.
PLI displayed to aircrews would not prevent misidentification of friendly
entities as enemy: however, it would alert the aircrews to the presence,
disposition, and proximity to the target of friendly personnel. Aircrews then
would be better able to orient their attack to prevent the effects of their
ordnance from affecting adjacent friendly entities.
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A display of the active indirect fire mission weapon-target lines on aircrew SA
devices would enhance pilots ability to avoid the danger of crossing the flight
path of ordnance, especially rifle company mortars.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Four areas for further study exist, which could add to the conclusions made in this
study.
First, increase the number and type of environments modeled to include winter
conditions in Norway; jungle conditions in Africa, Asia, and South America; and large
metropolitan area urban conditions. The project would require the construction of these
terrain databases before research could begin.
Second, increasing the number of workstations and re-running the scenarios
would validate the results of this thesis. The number of workstations should be increased
to allow only members of small teams (weapon crews and infantry fire-teams) to possess
perfect knowledge of each other's position; this would more accurately represent real
battlefield conditions, especially during MOUT. With enough workstations, the
simulations could be further enhanced to allow evaluation of the effect of human intuition
and indecision. Each small unit could be assigned to a workstation and controlled by a
Marine of the appropriate rank and experience. The simulation would unfold as a war
game played by actual Marines who make the fire no-fire decisions. The results of the
scenarios would be recorded by Janus and replayed for an analyst to evaluate in much the
same manner as was done in this thesis.
Third, model the interaction of forces in an operation other than war. Ensure
combatants and noncombatants are intermingled in the scenario.
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Fourth, via simulation, evaluate the aviation specific SA data requirements for
CID focussing on air-ground interactions as viewed from the aircrew perspective.
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